Article 32 is the "show me" article: it does not mandate specific technology, it mandates demonstrability. The listed measures — pseudonymisation, confidentiality and integrity of systems, restoration ability, regular testing — are exactly what an assessor asks evidence for, and the "regularly tested" clause is what makes a one-off penetration report insufficient.
You must implement "appropriate technical and organisational measures" — encryption, integrity, resilience, and the ability to demonstrate them on demand.
Security claims need evidence. Tamper-evident logging, scoped credentials, and verifiable integrity proofs are the artifacts an assessor actually asks for.
Hash-chained append-only audit vault with signed exports — integrity you verify cryptographically, not attest.
Last reviewed 2026-11-01.
Reading up on Art. 32 — Security of processing? The engine verifies this surface from the perimeter — live on sovereign EU/UK partitions.